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Austria had already developed an integration policy when 
the refugee crisis hit the country in 2015. However, 
600,000 refugees in transit in Austria and 88,340 requests 
for asylum had serious repercussions on public opinion. 
The Austrian government responded with a series of ex-
ternal measures to secure the borders and to curb uncon-
trolled migration, while at the same time internally refining 
the legal and organisational structures for the integration 
of recognised asylum-seekers and persons in need of sub-
sidiary protection. In this context, an increasingly restric-
tive approach to the policy field may be observed, which 
will presumably continue to be pursued following the na-
tional election in October 2017.
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1. Austria and the Refugee Crisis of 2015: 
Introduction
Due to its geographical location as one of the countries at the end of the West-
ern Balkans route, Austria was directly confronted with the consequences of 
the refugee crisis of 2015. While more than 600,000 refugees passed through 
the country – often unregistered – to other destinations like Germany and 
Sweden, 88,340 requested asylum in Austria. This was the highest annual 
number of applications for asylum in the Second Republic and represented a 
sharp increase in comparison with the previous year (28,064 cases). Relative 
to its population size, Austria became the second country of destination in 
the European Union (preceded only by Sweden) with 10.3 asylum seekers 
per 1,000 inhabitants. A total of 72% of the asylum applications were filed by 
refugees from Afghanistan (29%), Syria (28%) and Iraq (15%). This explains 
the high number of applications granted (52%) to either asylum-seekers or 
persons in need of subsidiary protection, who also cannot be sent back due 
to a deteriorating human rights situation or internal warfare in their countries 
of origin (Integrationsbericht 2016, pp. 23–31).
At first, the government and the security forces seemed to be surprised 
by this development. Chaotic scenes at the border and at transit railway 
stations, notably in Vienna and Salzburg, finally led to the introduction 
of military personnel alongside the police force. This exceptional situa-
tion had serious repercussions on the opinion of the Austrian population. 
A representative survey in October 2015 showed that 83.7% of Austri-
ans were concerned because of the current immigration of refugees. To 
a certain degree this was true for the majority of voters of all political 
parties: while 96.3% of the voters of the right-wing populist FPÖ party 
were very or rather concerned, this also applied to 75.8% of the voters of 
the conservative ÖVP, 72% of the voters of the social-democratic SPÖ, 
and as many as 58.2% of the voters of the Greens. While 23.1% of the 
interviewed were engaged either personally of financially in helping the 
refugees, 54.6% saw only negative consequences of the immigration of 
refugees into Austria. Sixty-nine per cent feared growing pressure on the 
social systems, 65.3% feared more social conflict, and 60.1% feared the 
growing “Islamisation” of the country. Alarmingly for the government, 
61.7% criticised the corresponding policies of the great coalition of SPÖ 
and ÖVP and 73.7% were not convinced that the government could come 
up with a useful strategy regarding the refugee crisis. However, 24.2% 
were convinced that such a strategy could be successfully elaborated by 
the opposition FPÖ party (Marketagent.com, 2015, pp. 1-5).
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At the same time, the additional costs of the refugee crisis strained the 
national budget with € 0.4 billion in 2015 and €0.8 billion in 2016. The 
Ministry of Finance put the total annual expenditure for refugees at €1.67 
billion in 2016 and €1.71 billion in 2017 (Fiskalrat, 2017, p. 19). The mu-
nicipalities directly affected by the refugee crisis in 2015 were compen-
sated with €37.5 million for their expenditures (Millionen Euro für Länder 
und Gemeinden, 2017).
The government reacted to the refugee crisis by a series of external and 
internal measures, which on the one hand were designed to secure the 
border in order to control and curtail immigration, and on the other hand 
to foster the integration of the migrants who had already arrived as well as 
of future refugees into the Austrian system.
2.  External Effects: Securing the Borders
2.1.  Re-establishment of border controls (September 2015)
Following the often chaotic situation of refugees arriving uncontrolled 
at the Austrian border via Hungary and Slovenia, the government took 
the first measure of introducing the re-establishment of border controls 
between 16 September 2015 and 10 November 2017 under the Schen-
gen regime (Verordnung der Bundesministerin für Inneres über die 
vorübergehende Wiedereinführung von Grenzkontrollen an den Binnen-
grenzen, BGBl. II Nr. 260/2015). In the subsequent months, the main 
border crossings were equipped with new installations of a so-called “bor-
der management”, allowing for the channelling of refugees through the 
first stages of police and administrative procedures. 
2.2.  Western Balkans Conference in Vienna  
(February 2016)
However, the new “border management” was never really put to the test 
because on 24 February 2016 the Western Balkans Conference in Vienna 
adopted far-reaching decisions, which finally resulted in the closing down 
of the Western Balkans route. With the notable exception of Germany 
and Greece, who had not been invited, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
and Ministers of the Interior of Austria, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
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Bulgaria, Kosovo, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia 
adopted a resolution called Managing Migration Together (Federal Minis-
try of Interior, 2016). Collateral damage, like the withdrawal of the Greek 
ambassador from Vienna, was obviously subordinate to the dominant se-
curity issues. Item 3 of the ministerial declaration clearly states that it is 
not possible to process unlimited numbers of migrants and asylum appli-
cants due to limited resources and reception capacities, potential conse-
quences for internal security and social cohesion, as well as challenges 
with regard to integration. ”Therefore, the migration flow along the West-
ern Balkans route needs to be substantially reduced with a view to allevi-
ating disproportionate burdens on the partners along the route” (Item 5). 
To reach this goal the signatories agreed to further intensify their border 
cooperation (Item 8), while at the same time referring to measures of 
deterrence as described in Item 18: “Austrian experiences have shown 
that targeted information may reduce the influx of illegal migrants from 
particular countries of origin. Therefore, joint communication strategies 
in relevant countries of origin will be developed, aiming at the dissemina-
tion of accurate information on the risks of migrant smuggling and human 
trafficking as well as on the consequences of illegal entries to and stays in 
another country.” (Federal Ministry of Interior, 2016, pp. 2–3).
2.3.  Police and Military Missions to Hungary, Macedonia, 
Serbia, and Slovenia
Furthermore, during the Vienna West Balkans Conference “the Ministers 
took note of the Joint Statement of Heads of Police Services from Aus-
tria, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia agreed upon at the meeting 
held in Zagreb on 18 February 2016” and confirmed that “[t]he included 
operational measures [were] a decisive contribution for the implementa-
tion of this Ministerial declaration” (Federal Ministry of Interior, 2016, p. 
4). The Joint Statement of Heads of Police underlined “that the migration 
flow along the Western Balkans route [had] to be reduced to the greatest 
possible extent” and tried, inter alia, to unify the registration forms and 
registration procedures for refugees (Joint Statement, 2016, pp. 1–2). The 
statement strongly emphasized security issues and police cooperation as a 
way to control and deter migration coming from Greece via the Western 
Balkans route: “The deployment of foreign police officers along the Mac-
edonian–Greek border already yields positive results and conveys a strong 
message that the countries concerned are resolute in jointly coping with 
the migration crisis” (Joint Statement, 2016, item 10, p. 2).
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Accordingly, at the end of February 2016 Austria deployed seven police 
officers to Macedonia, having already sent small police forces to Slovenia, 
the Hungarian–Serbian and Serbian–Macedonian borders in 2015 (Bun-
desministerium für Inneres, 2016 a, n.p.). From March 2016 onwards, 
the Austrian military also conducted the AUTCON HUN mission, which 
stationed 50 Austrian soldiers in Hungary (Bundesheer, n.d., n.p.).
All these measures taken together were designed to ensure the permanent 
closure of the Western Balkans route by forging a national and interna-
tional alliance to prevent the possible repetition of the refugee crisis of 
2015. The signal to the refugees as well as to the Greek (and Italian) 
partner(s) was clear: the closing and guarding of the borders externalised 
the pressure under which the national systems had come in the summer 
and autumn of 2015 and placed it again on the countries of the first safe 
arrival. In this context, however, it should also be noted that Austria was 
not only a country of transit like the Western Balkan states, but had al-
ready taken in a considerable number of asylum-seekers. In the absence of 
a common and solidary European solution, Austria and its southeastern 
neighbours took uni- and multilateral steps designed to keep the migra-
tion pressure external and complemented these with internal measures in 
the field of security and integration policies.
3.  Internal Effects: Security and Integration 
Policies
3.1.  Austrian Integration Policy
Several years before the refugee crisis became acute, Austria had elabo-
rated a national integration policy. The SPÖ–ÖVP government program 
of 2008 included a chapter on migration and integration, significantly un-
der the rubric “Interior, Justice and Defence”. Herein, integration was de-
fined as a cross-sectional and cross-social matter which affects all levels of 
the state. The government also announced the elaboration of a National 
Action Plan for Integration (Regierungsprogramm 2008–2013, 2008, p. 
107). This document was finally adopted in 2010 and defined general 
guidelines for the integration policy, as well as seven concrete operational 
fields: language and education, work and profession, rule of law and val-
ues, health and social affairs, intercultural dialogue, sports and leisure, 
and housing and the regional dimension of integration. From the begin-
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ning integration in this sense encompassed two dimensions: support for 
and demands on migrants. The fundamental basis for integration was thus 
described as learning the German language; economic self-preservation; 
commitment to Austria, its norms and values; and the willingness of the 
migrants to integrate into Austrian society (Nationaler Aktionsplan für 
Integration, 2010, p. 8). To monitor migration and integration, a yearly 
status report consisting of 25 indicators in the fields of language and edu-
cation; work and profession; social affairs and health; security; living and 
spatial context; family type; naturalisations; and subjective questions on 
the integration climate was introduced (e.g. Statistik Austria, 2016).
The year 2010 also saw an autonomous Expert Panel on Integration and 
a supplementary Advisory Board on Integration installed under the aus-
pices of the Ministry of the Interior, with the board encompassing repre-
sentatives of federal and regional administrations, associations of towns 
and municipalities, social partners, the industrial association, and NGOs. 
Both bodies were designed to develop the integration policy further and 
to ensure the overall implementation of the National Action Plan for In-
tegration (Expertenbeirat für Integration, n.d., n.p.; Integrationsbeirat, 
n.d., n.p.). The institutional setting was completed in 2011 with the es-
tablishment of a State Secretariat for Integration within the Ministry of 
the Interior and its transformation in 2013 to the Foreign Ministry, when 
State Secretary Sebastian Kurz became foreign minister. Consequently 
the ministry was renamed as the Ministry for Europe, Integration and 
Foreign Affairs. In the ministry a new section VIII Integration was formed, 
which consists of a General Policy Division (Dept. VIII.1), a Coordina-
tion of Integration Division (Dept. VIII.2) and a Support for Integration 
Division (Dept. VIII.3) (Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und 
Äußeres a, n.d., n.p.).1 In addition, there is the Austrian Integration Fund, 
which is responsible, inter alia, for the organisation of language and values 
courses and general counselling for migrants (Österreichischer Integra-
tionsfond a, n.d., n.p.). The fund has regional centres in all Länder and 
monitors the fulfilment of the so-called Integrationsvereinbarungen (agree-
ments for integration) that non-EU migrants have had to sign since 2011. 
The agreements obligate the migrants to take German language courses 
up to B2 level according to the CEFRL (Österreichischer Integrations-
fonds b, n.d., n.p.). This Austrian structure for integration has particularly 
been studied by German institutions and has been labelled as advanced 
1 For the actual distribution of functions in Dept. VIII following the national election 
of October 2017 see Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres b, n.d., n.p.
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and successful in a bilateral and European comparison (Herold, 2017, p. 
10; Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migra-
tion, 2016, p. 23).
3.2 The Fifty-Point Plan for Integration (November 2015)
The framework described above was, however, not designed to cope with 
a mass phenomenon like the refugee crisis of 2015. Therefore, in Novem-
ber 2015 the Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, in co-
operation with the Expert Panel on Integration, published the Fifty-Point 
Plan for the Integration of Recognised Asylum-Seekers and of Persons in 
Need of Subsidiary Protection in Austria (“Fünfzig Punkte-Plan zur Inte-
gration von Asylberechtigten und subsidiär Schutzberechtigten in Österreich”). 
This plan was approved by the government in its session of 9 January 
2016 and thus became the foundation for the official policy of Austria 
towards recognised refugees. Like the National Action Plan of 2011, the 
Fifty-Point Plan of 2015 strongly emphasized the performance criterion 
as a prerequisite for integration, which links access to the benefits of the 
European welfare state with a quid pro quo on the part of the legally 
accepted refugees. In this sense, integration requires the ability and the 
willingness of the refugees to make an active effort to integrate into Aus-
trian society, while it is the duty of the state to arrange for the necessary 
background conditions (Fünfzig Punkte-Plan, 2015, p. 3).
These conditions were defined in the form of eight action fields – lan-
guage and education, work and profession, rule of law and values, health 
and social affairs, intercultural dialogue, sports and leisure, living and 
the regional dimension of integration, and general structural measures 
– encompassing 50 concrete measures. The Ministry declared language 
training, integration into the labour market, and the acceptance of values 
as the central elements of its strategy (Bundesministerium für Europa, 
Integration und Äußeres c, n.d., n.p.). For example, in the field of lan-
guage and education a second compulsory kindergarten year was fore-
seen for refugee children with a language deficit, as well as structured 
programmes for adults learning German. For better integration into the 
labour market refugee qualifications should be checked as early as possi-
ble (“competence check”) and where required should be complemented 
by job-specific language courses. Language acquisition also plays a vital 
role in the acceptance of values and orientations, which should familiar-
ise refugees with Austrian culture (inter alia democracy, rule of law, and 
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equal rights) and clarify “what society expects from them and what is not 
negotiable in order to guarantee the peaceful coexistence of all people in 
Austria” (Fünfzig Punkte-Plan, 2015, pp. 6, 9, 10–12). Perhaps surpris-
ingly, the security issue was rather marginally mentioned in the chapter 
on intercultural dialogue. Here the prevention of radicalisation refers to 
the circumvention of Islamisation, the promotion of a “European Islam” 
and counter-measures against racism, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia 
(Fünfzig Punkte-Plan, 2015, p. 16).
3.3 Asylum Summit (January 2016)
The asylum summit which took place on 20 January 2016 between the 
federal government, the Länder governments, cities, and municipalities 
showed, however, to what extent Austrian politicians were actually con-
cerned with security issues. The first sentence of the corresponding doc-
ument states that Austria must sustainably reduce the inflow of refugees 
and migration into the country. The orderly control of entries is referred 
to as the “first and supreme goal” which requires comprehensive and flex-
ible border management. These measures should ensure that applications 
for asylum are only possible in EU hotspots and no longer directly in 
Austria (Asylgipfel, 2016, p. 2).
The politically and legally most controversial decision of the asylum 
summit was the introduction of an annual “refugee quota”. Thus Aus-
tria would take in refugees equivalent to no more than 1.5% of its own 
population over a period of 4 years. This quota allowed for 37,500 asy-
lum applications in 2016; 35,000 in 2017; 30,000 in 2018; and 25,000 
in 2019 (Asylgipfel, 2016, pp. 2–3). The legally non-binding decision – a 
draft law which has not yet been approved and has apparently been with-
drawn in the meantime due to the current coalition crisis (Verordnung 
zur Feststellung der Gefährdung der Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen 
Ordnung und des Schutzes der inneren Sicherheit – geplante Neuerun-
gen (“Asylnotverordnung”) – Begutachtungsentwurf für Asyl-Notverord-
nung (2016))2 – was an important political signal that Austria would not 
accept uncontrolled and unlimited migration flows any longer. This led to 
2 Such a decree can be based on Art, 36 paras. 1 and 2 Asylum Law, which state that 
in the case of an endangerment of public order and internal security, the rules of border 
management can be changed. Particularly the number of asylum-seekers arriving at the bor-
ders shall be taken into account.
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a modification of “border management” as Austria began to only accept 
80 asylum applications per day and only allowed a maximum of 3,200 ref-
ugees pass through the country each day in transit to other reception des-
tinations (e.g. Flüchtlinge: Tägliche Obergrenzen sind nun in Kraft, 2016, 
February 19). Austria was heavily criticised by the European Commission 
for these steps (e.g. Flüchtlinge: EU wirft Österreich bei Obergrenzen 
Rechtsbruch vor, 2016, February, 18) but due to the Western Balkans 
Conference and the closure of the Western Balkans route (see 2.2) the 
numbers of asylum-seekers given above have not been reached, so the 
quota has not yet been put to the test.
Furthermore, the asylum summit decided that in the case of denied asy-
lum applications, the repatriation of refugees to their countries of origin 
or safe third countries should be enforced (Asylgipfel, 2016, p. 3). The 
document also stressed the fact that the handling of the refugee crisis 
required supplementary police forces. In this context it is said that the 
Austrian police has expanded by 1,500 posts, of which 750 are envisaged 
for the coverage of border- and refugee-related issues (Asylgipfel, 2016, 
p. 4). Finally, the Austrian understanding of integration was reiterated 
in the sense that asylum-seekers were expected to show respect for the 
social order and social values, as well as the willingness to cooperate and 
personal responsibility. Positive measures like the additional allowance of 
€75 million for integration were combined with the intention to elaborate 
a strategy against radicalisation and the possible extension of a so-called 
“integration year” for recognised asylum-seekers (Asylgipfel, 2016, p. 4).
3.4.  Reduction of Minimum Social Collateral in Lower and 
Upper Austria
The refugee crisis with direct costs of approximately €2 billion in 2016, 
of which two-thirds were social benefits (Integrationsbericht 2016, 2016, 
p. 34), also instigated a debate about the minimum social collateral for 
asylum-seekers. Two conservative Länder – Upper and Lower Austria – 
unilaterally decided to reduce the corresponding rights for recognised asy-
lum-seekers. Upper Austria cut back the minimum social collateral from 
€914 to €365 per person, plus a €155 “integration bonus” linked to the 
fulfilment of an “integration agreement”. The avowed aim was to become 
less attractive for asylum-seekers (e.g. OÖ: Mindestsicherung für Asylb-
erechtigte wird gekürzt, 2016, June, 16). Upper Austria was followed by 
Lower Austria. Instead of €838 per person, an upper limit of €1,500 per 
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household and a minimum social collateral of €572.50, including an “inte-
gration bonus” per person, were introduced for everybody “who in the last 
six years had stayed regularly in Austria for less than five years” (e.g. Die 
Presse, 19.10.2016). Since the other Länder, and notably Vienna, did not 
follow this line, the consequence was “secondary migration”, which pri-
marily hit the capital city of Vienna, where 40.1% of all migrants and 70% 
of recognised asylum-seekers and persons in need of subsidiary protection 
had already been living (Integrationsbericht 2016, 2016, pp. 20–21). Of 
the latter groups, 31,505 received the minimum social collateral of €837 
for Vienna in 2015, whereas in 2016 this number had already grown to 
42,847 persons (Krutzler, 2017, January 18).
3.5.  “For Austria” Government Programme (January 2017)
While the actual number of asylum-seekers decreased sharply after the 
closure of the Western Balkans route – 42,285 in 2016 compared to 
88,340 in 2015, which is a reduction of 52.13% (Bundesministerium für 
Inneres, 2016 b, p. 8) – the internal debate linking integration and secu-
rity intensified considerably. A witness to this is the preamble of the new 
“Für Österreich” (For Austria) government programme that was issued 
in January 2017. Here, the creation and securing of individually felt secu-
rity is identified as a fundamental political task. The following sentences 
are even overtly populist in stating that “[i]n our country there must not 
be regions in which women are frightened to go along the streets in the 
evening. Integration must follow the premise of support and demands. 
We’re giving a chance and making an offer to people willing to integrate. 
But those who are not willing to accept the values of enlightenment will 
have to leave our country and our society” (Für Österreich, 2017, p. 1).
Chapter 4 of the government programme is labelled “Security and Inte-
gration” and contains the measures planned until the end of the legisla-
tive period. The government intended to elaborate an Integration Law 
as a new and legally binding form for the different approaches contained 
in the integration plans (see 3.1 and 3.2) as well as a “burka ban” and 
a Law on Integration into the Labour Market (Integration Year) (Für 
Österreich, 2017, p. 26). At the same time in point 4.6 of the document 
the government announced its plans to cut back migration. Elements of 
this policy were the enforcement of border controls, the assistance mis-
sion of the Austrian army at the borders, incentives for non-recognised 
asylum-seekers to return voluntarily to their countries of origin, and a 
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new regime for the expulsion of non-recognised asylum-seekers (Für Ös-
terreich, 2017, pp. 27–30). As the “ultima ratio” the government would 
introduce the “refugee quota” based on art. 36 Asylum Law (see 3.3) (Für 
Österreich, 2017, p. 30). 
3.6. Integration Package (June 2017)
Following the new government programme, the Integration Package 
passed on 12 June 2017 consists of the Integration Law, the Federal Law 
Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in Public, and some changes 
concerning other laws. The Integration Law as the most important part of 
this package thus became the new legal basis for the Austrian integration 
policy. At the beginning, the dichotomy of support for and demands on 
migrants as previously defined in the National Action Plan for Integration 
of 2010 and later in the Fifty-Point Plan for Integration of 2015 (see 3.1 
and 3.2) is repeated (Integrationsgesetz, 2017, §1.1). It is also clearly em-
phasized that Austria is a liberal and democratic state, whose values and 
principles are not subject to debate and must be accepted (Integrations-
gesetz, 2017, §1.2). The law defines integration as a process encompass-
ing the whole of society, which requires the cooperation of all the people 
living in Austria. The migrants, however, have a special task of contribut-
ing actively to this process, participating in integration measures, and ac-
cepting and respecting the fundamental values of a democratic European 
state. At the same time, public institutions at all levels have the duty to 
offer systematic integration measures that should be harmonised between 
public and civil society actors (Integrationsgesetz, 2017, §2.1).
The integration measures shall enable migrants to participate in the so-
cial, economic, and cultural life in Austria, while self-sustained employ-
ment, learning opportunities, gender equality, and the ability to practise 
self-preservation are central elements in this context. The final result 
should be the bestowal of (exclusive) Austrian citizenship (Integrations-
gesetz, 2017, §2.2). Articles 4 and 5 refer to language and values courses, 
while article 6 regulates the integration agreements which migrants are 
obliged to sign. They contain the obligation to complete language and 
values courses and the obligation to accept the fundamental values of the 
rule of law and the social order (Integrationsgesetz, 2017, §6.1). In the 
case of violation of these regulations, sanctions in the form of a reduc-
tion of social benefits or the minimum social collateral are foreseen, and 
these are equal to the sanctions for unwillingness to work (Integrations-
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gesetz, 2017, §6.2). Article 7 ff. explicate the integration agreement and 
module 1 (i.e. German language courses up to level A2 and basic values 
courses) and module 2 (German language courses up to level B1 and a 
thorough understanding of the fundamental values of the legal and social 
order of the Austrian Republic). The uniformity and consistent organisa-
tion of these courses and the corresponding exams is the responsibility of 
the Austrian Integration Fund (see 3.1). Article17 ff. apply to the Expert 
Panel on Integration and to the Advisory Board on Integration (see 3.1) 
and provide them with a legal basis. The same holds true for integration 
monitoring and a research coordination unit for integration within the 
Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (Integrationsgesetz, 
2017, Article 21–22). The failure to fulfil the obligations of module 1 of 
the integration agreements within two years will result in an administra-
tive penalty amounting to €500 or a prison sentence of two weeks (Inte-
grationsgesetz, 2017, Article 23.1).
Art. 2 of the Integration Package contains the Federal Law Prohibiting the 
Concealment of the Face in Public (Bundesgesetz über das Verbot der Ver-
hüllung des Gesichts in der Öffentlichkeit), popularly called the “Burka Ban” 
even though it sanctions the concealment of the face in public places in 
general (e.g. Brickner, 2017, February 8). It is only in the accompanying 
explanations for the Council of Ministers that the integration context be-
comes indirectly visible. According to this, the law intends to strengthen 
participation – supposedly of Muslim women – in social life and peaceful 
coexistence in a pluralistic society (Beschlussprotokoll des 33. Ministerrats 
vom 28. Februar 2017; Erläuterungen zu 33/20, 2017, p. 12).
Even more obscured is the legal basis for the prohibition of the distribu-
tion of the Qur’an, which became a particular problem in Vienna due to 
the Salafist and radical background of the distributors (e.g. Imlinger, 2015, 
November 23). In order to prohibit such activities, road traffic regulations 
have been altered by the Immigration Package. A new §83.3 stipulates that 
in the case of any violation of public order, the security authorities shall 
be informed accordingly and a permission for the utilisation of roads for 
non-traffic purposes must be denied. The accompanying explanations for 
the Council of Ministers declare that this amendment shall, among other 
things, prohibit distribution activities which endanger public security (Bes-
chlussprotokoll des 33. Ministerrats vom 28. Februar 2017, Erläuterungen 
zu 33/20, 2017, p. 14). However, only experts in this matter and careful 
newspaper readers are able to make a connection between this somewhat 
cryptic regulation and the distribution of the Qur’an (e.g. Österreich verbi-
etet Burka und die Verteilung des Koran, 2017, March, 28). 
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3.7.  The Law on Integration into the Labour Market  
(June 2017)
The growing emphasis placed on the demands on refugees also became 
clear with regard to the new Law on Integration into the Labour Market 
(“Arbeitsmarktintegrationsgesetz”). People eligible for asylum and people 
in need of subsidiary protection who have no valid work contracts are 
obliged to partake in measures provided for in the framework of the so-
called integration year (Integrationsjahr). The voluntary integration year, 
which had already been offered previously as a qualification measure, thus 
became obligatory. Violations of the obligation to participate in the cor-
responding activities result in the reduction of the minimum social collat-
eral (Arbeitsmarktintegrationsgesetz, 2017, §3.2). An innovation is §3.3, 
which stipulates that asylum-seekers who will supposedly be recognised 
in the future are also entitled to participate in integration year measures 
on a voluntary basis. For all the programme participants the employment 
bureau has to issue an “integration card”, which specifies the modules 
completed during the integration year (Arbeitsmarktintegrationsgesetz, 
2017, §§4.1–4.2). The modules include the examination of competences, 
the recognition of qualifications, language and values courses, orientation 
and job application training, and vocational training. The module that 
attracted the most public attention was vocational training without the 
requirement of official employment for up to 12 months in public wel-
fare institutions. Such institutions can belong to the federal, Länder, and 
municipal level, other public bodies, or NGOs (§5.3 Arbeitsmarktintegra-
tionsgesetz, 2017, §5.3 in conjunction with Zivildienstgesetz, 1986, §4.2).
3.8.  Law Concerning the Modification of Rules Relating  
to Foreigners (June 2017)
The last step (at present) in the design of integration and refugee legis-
lation is the Law concerning the Modification of Rules relating to For-
eigners (“Fremdenrechtsänderungsgesetz – FrÄG”). The law stipulates, 
inter alia, that the delinquency of third-country nationals has to be taken 
into account when deciding on administrative detention prior to depor-
tation. The detention time can now be up to 18 months (Fremdenre-
chtsänderungsgesetz, 2017, Art. 2, §76.2a and §80.7). Foreigners who 
do not leave the country voluntarily after a corresponding administrative 
decision has been taken and communicated to them have to pay a penalty 
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between €5,000 and €15,000. Foreigners who have forged documents or 
given false information in order to obtain asylum status also have to pay 
a penalty between €1,000 and €5,000 (Fremdenrechtsänderungsgesetz, 
2017, Art. 2; Art. 120 paras 1b and 2).
4.  Policy Field Under Political Pressure
The refugee crisis of 2015 can be seen as the direct trigger for multiple ex-
ternal and internal measures of the Austrian political system. These have 
resulted in securing the borders against refugees and in the successive 
legal regulation of migration and integration. However, the question may 
be posed why the government still continues to tighten the framework 
conditions for recognised asylum-seekers and persons in need of subsid-
iary protection following the factual end – at least for Austria, in com-
parison with Greece and now primarily Italy – of the refugee crisis in the 
winter of 2015. While the number of refugees has decreased sharply, the 
legal initiatives placing demands on migrants and threatening them with 
sanctions have notably increased. The responsibility for this most proba-
bly lies in internal political motives, with almost all parties trying to react 
to the negative attitude of the majority of the Austrian population to-
wards migration in general. Before the snap election of October 2017, the 
SPÖ and ÖVP coalition government has thus been able to show a tough 
stance on migration issues. The price for this was the implicit adoption 
of demands formerly rather strongly associated with the right-wing pop-
ulist FPÖ party. Within the government, a coalition of hard-liners – the 
former Ministers of the Interior (Mickl-Leitner and Sobotka, both ÖVP), 
the former Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (Kurz, 
ÖVP), and the former Minister for Defence (Doskozil, SPÖ) – from both 
government parties dominated the political discourse on refugees and mi-
gration. While a comprehensive legal framework regulating the rights and 
obligations of foreigners in Austria is now in place, the political discussion 
before the elections grew harsher. One sign was the debate on the possi-
ble border closure towards Italy because of the influx of refugees via the 
Mediterranean. Before any real escalation had taken place at the border, 
the Minister of Defence prepared soldiers and tanks for a border mission 
at Brenner Pass with the explicit support of the Minister for Europe, In-
tegration and Foreign Affairs. Although consultations with the Austrian 
ambassador had been requested by the Italian foreign ministry, the Aus-
trian election campaign of 2017 was the dominant factor for the relevant 
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Austrian actors regarding the refugee policy (e.g. Grenzschutz: Doskozil 
will „eindeutige Signale nach Brüssel senden“, 2017, July, 4; Österreich 
will Brenner kontrollieren, Italien reagiert verstimmt, 2017, July, 4).
5.  Conclusion: The Kurz Government and its 
Programme “Together. For Our Austria”
Following the national election of 15 October 2017, Sebastian Kurz, the 
former Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, formed a co-
alition government under his lead between the renamed conservative party 
“ÖVP – Die neue Volkspartei – Liste Kurz” (31.5 % of the vote) and the pop-
ulist FPÖ party (26% of the vote) (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2017, 
n.p.). The most important and finally decisive discussion points during the 
electoral campaign had been asylum and integration (very important for 
58% of the electorate), social benefits (very important for 49% of the elec-
torate), and security (very important for 40% of the electorate) (SORA/ISA, 
2017, p. 11). Not surprisingly, the new coalition government has stressed 
these issues in its political agenda for 2017–2022. The second chapter of 
the new government programme is titled “Order and Security” and its first 
topic is internal security, which contains, inter alia, the political goals to 
“strictly align legal migration with Austrian needs” and “to fight against and 
stop illegal migration”. Other goals are the “consequent prevention of As-
ylmissbrauch” (abuse of asylum) and more rapid, efficient procedures for 
granting the right of asylum (Regierungsprogramm 2017–2022, pp. 32–35). 
The “Order and Security” chapter has integration as its second topic. Four 
pages list the basic principles of the government’s general approach – “in-
tegration through performance”, “upholding of our constitutionally fixed 
values”, “fight against political Islam” – as well as many concrete measures 
to further enhance “strategy, transparency and control” in the field of inte-
gration (Regierungsprogramm 2017–2022, pp. 37–40).
Initial announcements of intent to establish, for example, separate reme-
dial classes for children with a German language deficit, to standardise 
and reduce the minimum social collateral for recognised refugees, or to 
adjust the legal framework in order to provide asylum-seekers only with 
non-cash benefits in the future, suggest that the increasingly strict Austri-
an approach towards migration and integration, particularly since 2015, 
will be tightened further under the new government. As Austria holds the 
presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2018, it may 
also be assumed that a special focus will be placed on the fifth chapter 
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“Union of Freedom, Security and Justice” of the current 18-month work 
programme of the EU Council. Action fields such as migration manage-
ment, strengthening of external EU borders, or an “effective return poli-
cy” (Council of the European Union, 2017, p. 12) are all very high on the 
agenda of the ÖVP–FPÖ coalition and constitute priority concerns for 
the majority of the Austrian electorate. 
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EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL EFFECTS OF HOW AUSTRIA HAS 
HANDLED THE REFUGEE CRISIS
Summary
Austria was hit especially hard by the refugee crisis of 2015, with the population 
reacting negatively to the influx of migrants and asylum-seekers. New “border 
management”, the closure of the Western Balkans route, and police as well as 
military missions to neighbouring countries were the external measures put into 
place by the Austrian government. At the same time the integration policy has 
been further regulated with a number of political and legislative actions. Polit-
ical measures include the Fifty-Point Plan for Integration (November 2015), 
the Asylum Summit (January 2016) and the new “For Austria” government 
programme (January 2017). These became the basis for the Integration Law, the 
Federal Law Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in Public, the Law on 
Integration into the Labour Market, and the Law Concerning the Modification 
of the Rules Relating to Foreigners (all introduced in June 2017). While the 
number of refugees has sharply decreased, the legal initiatives putting demands 
on migrants and threatening them with sanctions have thus notably increased – 
an attitude that persists and even has been further reinforced after the elections 
of 2017 and the formation of the new ÖVP-FPÖ coalition government.
Keywords: refugee crisis, migration, integration
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VANJSKI I UNUTARNJI UTJECAJI AUSTRIJSKOGA PRISTUPA 
MIGRANTSKOJ KRIZI 
Sažetak
Austriju je vrlo teško pogodila migrantska kriza 2015. godine, te je stanovniš-
tvo negativno reagiralo na priljev migranata i tražitelja azila. Vanjske mjere 
koje je uvela Austrijska vlada uključivale su nov način „upravljanja granicom“, 
zatvaranje zapadno-balkanske rute te slanje policijskih i vojnih izaslanstava u 
susjedne države. Integracijska je politika istovremeno doživjela nastavak regu-
lacije uvođenjem brojnih političkih i zakonskih mjera. Političke su mjere uklju-
čivale Plan od pedeset točaka za integraciju (uveden u studenom 2015. god.), 
Sastanak o azilu (održan u siječnju 2016. god.) i novi program vlade pod na-
zivom „Za Austriju“ (donesen u siječnju 2017. god.). Ove su mjere predstavljale 
temelj sljedećih zakona donesenih u lipnju 2017. godine: Zakona o integraciji, 
Zakona o zabrani skrivanja lica u javnosti, Zakona o integraciji na tržište rada 
te Zakona o izmjenama pravila o stranim državljanima Iako se broj pristiglih 
izbjeglica znatno smanjio, broj zakonskih inicijativa kojima se migrantima po-
stavljaju zahtjevi i prijeti im se sankcijama se osjetno povećao. Takav se pristup 
održao i nakon izbora 2017. i formiranja nove koalicijske vlade. 
Ključne riječi: izbjeglička kriza, migracija, integracija
